trade is not entirely appropriate. Hence, I use a new disaggregated dataset to estimate gravity models at the commodity-group level. The results show that while the network offered systematically positive effects for many commodity groups, but their sum is too small to show up as statistically significant in the aggregate. Especially, trade in manufactures and luxury goods rose. Exporters from countries whose diplomats were meticulous in negotiating tariff reductions tailored to domestic export interests reaped notably higher benefits. This suggests that commercial diplomacy did make a difference, albeit not necessarily in promoting universal free trade.
COMMERCIAL POLICY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF FOREIGN TRADE AFTER 1860
Since the end of the Napoleonic Wars, and especially in the 1840s and 1850s, Great
Britain and the economies of Continental Europe underwent a process of increasing internal and external physical market integration. 5 Advances in transport and communication technology had reduced natural barriers to trade, while the suppression of internal tariffs, most prominently in Germany, reduced institutional barriers to trade. 6 Progressing industrialization, economic growth and internal integration had caused national producers to become more and more dependent on foreign supplies of raw materials and-in the most advanced branches-on foreign markets to sell their commodities. Concurrently, European market integration had been brought to the forefront for many commodities in the 1840s and especially in the 1850s due to integration in transport and communication, as well as unilateral tariff reforms. As a consequence, at the end of the 1850s, tariff levels were generally low for foodstuffs and many raw materials for industrial production; while in most Continental European countries, tariffs on manufactured products such as iron and steel, and textiles remained high to protect national industries from inflows of cheap British products. 7 The United Kingdom itself constituted an exception, as tariffs had been brought down for almost all goods except "luxury articles" such as tobacco, coffee, wines, spirits, fancy goods (silk wares, etc.), and sugar, whose duties made up an important share in total public revenue.
To gain an internationally comparable picture of the distribution in tariff rates across countries and commodities, Table 1 displays ad valorem tariff equivalents for major noncolonial commodity groups in international trade in 1859, just prior to the conclusion of 5 Jacks, "Intra-and International Commodity Market Integration"; Shiue, "From Political Fragmentation"; Kaukiainen, "Shrinking the World"; and Ejrnaes and Persson, "Market Integration." 6 Bairoch, "European Trade Policy," pp. [15] [16] [17] and Keller and Shiue, "Tariffs." 7 Bairoch, "European Trade Policy," pp. 28-37. the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty. I employ a new dataset that provides information on trade flows, tariff rates and commercial treaties stipulations for the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria-Hungary and the German Zollverein from 1857 to 1875 in 21 internationally comparable commodity groups. 8 As the period under study predates even the beginning of the unification of tariff and statistical classifications by four decades, and national classifications were elaborated according to national industry and protection structures along with prevailing political beliefs, this partial classification was constructed from national trade statistics of the aforementioned countries in the following way: I first determined the 50 items with the highest import and export values for every country in 1865. After exclusion of articles that were important in one country only or which did not fit the research design, a partial classification of 21 internationally comparable commodity groups was established that forms the basis of all subsequent research. It should be noted that due to the aforementioned restrictions, the dataset explicitly excludes colonial and tropical commodities (cotton, tobacco, guano, indigo, or cane sugar) that were not produced to a considerable extent in Europe, and minerals like copper, zinc, or tin, whose exportability depended on the availability of deposits.
[ Table 1 about here] Table 1 shows that while average tariffs were already fairly low in most of Europe at the end of the 1850s, actual rates varied considerably across countries and industries, reflecting national industry structures and government preferences in protection and revenue generation.
While tariffs on wheat ranged from 0.0 to 2.5 percent, especially textiles, and iron and steel products were taxed very unevenly, with duties ranging from 0.0 percent in Britain to levels well beyond 20 percent in France, the Zollverein, and Belgium.
Peter T. Marsh highlighted this unequal distribution of tariffs, prior to 1860, as the watershed for the spread of the commercial negotiations, 9 alongside the variety of political developments and diplomatic events in the "concert of powers" in Europe. 10 Marsh stresses the importance of exporters as lobbies for tariff reductions in their export destinations, especially the woolens and worsteds manufacturers of the West Riding of Yorkshire on the British side. For French negotiators, the high British tariffs on wines and spirits were the central target, and vintners of the Gironde as well as producers of fine silken articles were the main interest groups favorable to a treaty that otherwise was harshly opposed by French 8 The dataset is documented in detail in Lampe, "Bilateral Trade Flows." 9 Marsh, Bargaining on Europe, chs. 3-4. 10 Dunham, Anglo-French Treaty; Iliasu, "Cobden-Chevalier Commercial Treaty", and Wendt, "Freihandel." manufacturers.
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Consequently, the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty led to a reduction of British duties on lighter wines by about 80 percent and the abolition of remaining British duties on articles of silk and different sorts of woolens such as laces, shawls, and coverlids. France abolished import prohibitions for British manufactures, and French duties for British semimanufactures were brought down to levels around 10 percent, while manufactures would pay ad valorem equivalents of about 15 percent. Both parties thus achieved tailor-made liberalizations for their exports that would not have been implemented unilaterally by the other party. The results of the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty came closer to "moderate protection" than to "free trade," as substantial duties remained. 12 Marsh also establishes why the subsequent development had to occur via France and why specific interests mattered for the treaty network's expansion at least as much as they had in the negotiations of the original treaty. Because it unilaterally generalized the "concessions" of the treaty of 1860, the United Kingdom had few potentially attractive preferences left for further negotiations. Official British diplomacy stuck to the free trade doctrine.
13
In the terminology of Jagdish Bhagwati, it argued for full reciprocity (absolutely identical market access aiming at nondiscriminatory free trade) while continental parties acted on the assumption of first-difference reciprocity (equal concessions made departing from differing initial conditions).
14 Thus it was that Great Britain, in further treaties, obtained mainly pure most favored nation (MFN) agreements, while the refusal to generalize its preferences granted enabled France to offer her differential treatment to further trading partners in subsequent negotiations. For example, Belgium and Prussia wanted to achieve similar conditions and further liberalizations tailored to their own export industries. The results of French negotiations with both saw further reductions in tariffs and increasing discrimination faced by outsiders to this emerging network. The latter aspect created incentives for further negotiations and the expansion of the network, while the former advanced trade liberalization.
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The result was that by the early 1870s, a densely knotted network of more than 50 bilateral treaties had formed in Europe which lowered average tariffs to a degree unmatched in international trade until the 1980s.
Although all agreements were formally bilateral, the resulting network possessed multilateral characteristics. All treaties stipulated the repeal of import and export prohibitions; freedom of transit; measures fostering the freedom of transnational commerce; and mutual 11 Nye, "Myth"; Nye, War; Irwin, "Free Trade"; and Dunham, 12 Irwin, "Multilateral and Bilateral Trade Policies, " p. 96; Nye, "Changing French Trade Conditions"; and Stein, "Hegemon's Dilemma." 13 Marsh, Bargaining on Europe, ch. 3; Howe, Free Trade, 7 concession of unconditional MFN status. Not all treaties included specific liberalizations; an increasing proportion of the agreements concluded in the late 1860s and 1870s convened pure mutual MFN status only. Still, these later treaties constituted an important prerequisite for the network as a stable system, as they linked stipulations of preceding treaties. 16 As an institution, the Cobden-Chevalier Network might be looked upon as similar to modern-day free trade areas, but with residual elements of internal discrimination.
[ Table 2 about here] Table 2 gives a picture of the distribution of preferences and liberalizations across commodity groups in the treaties. It has been elaborated from a total of 55 bilateral MFN treaties ratified among European countries until 1875. Of these agreements, 22 contained tailor-made preferences, while 33 convened MFN-status only. The table shows that the main focus of the bilateral treaties was on reducing tariffs on manufactured articles, such as textiles (cloths rather than yarns), ironware, articles of leather and rubber, and especially on wines and stronger alcoholic beverages. Negotiators certainly were not overly interested in cereals and milling products, which were some of the most important articles in international trade of that age and are most prominent in modern-day investigation of nineteenth-century commodity market integration.
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Of course, a glance at Table 1 reveals little to negotiate over for these commodities. This suggests that we should be cautious in interpreting overall effects, as a large segment of international trade was virtually excluded or at least underrepresented in the treaties.
[ Table 3 about here] Table 3 shows the outcome of commercial policy in the 1860s and early 1870s, as reflected in the state of tariffs in 1875. In comparison with Table 1 , it can be summarized as follows: While tariffs on many items were substantially reduced, others remained almost unaltered. British wine and spirits tariffs were reduced to less than one-third of their 1859 16 Irwin, "Multilateral and Bilateral Trade Policies, See App. 1 for a cross -table of sealing dates 18 Wheat, rye, and milling products represented about 5.6 percent of all imports of the countries in Table 1, and 13.2 percent of total imports in the commodity groups of Table 1. amount, as were French tariffs on many items, as well as the Zollverein's tariffs on cottons, iron and steel of all kinds, Belgian tariffs on woolen yarn, Austria-Hungary's tariffs on grains, yarns, and cloth, and, unilaterally, Dutch tariffs on yarns of all kinds. Raw materials remained mainly unaffected with a few exceptions, for example, the suppression of the British duties on timber as a result of the prolonged Anglo-Austrian negotiations.
19 Table 3 It explains that these increases could not be sufficiently attributed to augmented general prosperity, and that "[t] he significance of the augmentation should appear yet more in details. The special advantage of the treaty was intended to be the multiplication of exchanges in the articles which only one country produced, or in producing which it had an advance.
[…] Thus the value of our import of wine has nearly trebled in the eight years, while the quantity we take is from four to six times higher than it was. The progression in this article is consequently far above the general progress of our imports from France, which is so far a sign that the general augmentation is due to the augmentation in articles encouraged by the treaty." 22 The article demonstrates that the increase in imports of silk wares from France had been even higher than in wines. British exports to France in coal and textiles, most notably woolens and worsteds, had also grown well above average. Leone Levi confirmed these observations for later years, and gave additional figures regarding the exports of Austria- Hence, bilateralism appears to be a useless device, if an increase of international trade is the aim.
However, the material presented above makes clear that the treaties did not pursue overall trade liberalization, but the reduction of duties for specific commodities, and thus were intended to create economic possibilities for certain domestic exporters. In contrast, certain critical elements of international trade were hardly mentioned. Therefore, to examine the effects of the treaties in an appropriate manner, my subsequent analysis focuses on trade flows in specific commodity groups, which are those identified as being of considerable weight in the exports of those countries in Western and Central Europe, whose governments created the treaty network.
COMMERCIAL TREATIES AND BILATERAL TRADE, 1857-1875:
DATA AND METHODS
To assess the incidence of specific preferences and liberalizations, I gathered bilateral trade data from contemporary trade statistics for the each of the commodity groups presented in the previous section. Because only a few countries published systematic and reliable disaggregated statistics, the sample had to be limited to seven key countries in the world trade of our period: the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria-Hungary and the German Zollverein/Kaiserreich. Among these countries were also the core countries of the Cobden-Chevalier Network. The dataset contains import values for all of them at ten points in time, namely, every second year between 1857 and 1875. The core sample contains the 42 country-pairs constituted by these seven countries. An extended version, which is used for robustness checks of the results, also includes imports of these 23 Levi, "Statistical Results." 24 Marsh, Bargaining on Europe, ch. 4; Dunham, Cadier, "Consequences." 25 Accominotti and Flandreau, "Bilateral Trade Treaties"; see also the regression results by López-Córdova and Meissner, "Exchange Rate Regimes." countries from Switzerland, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Sweden-Norway, and Russia. 26 The dataset is presented and examined in detail in a separate study.
27
Its salient features include: First, the use of disaggregated data that enabled dealing comprehensively with inadequate official prices and lack of valuation. These were most notorious in the Zollverein's foreign trade statistics, which provided physical quantities only, and in Dutch statistics, in which unaltered benchmark prices established in 1846 were used for many items until 1914. In these instances, values were calculated and corrected using corresponding prices from reliable sources, in this case, the foreign trade tables published for the port of Hamburg, the United Kingdom and France. Second, the dataset prepared for this study is the first that comprehensively accounts for incorrect assignment of partner countries. This problem results from trade in transit and via entrepôts that generally was not recorded for the country it was originally shipped from, but rather the country whence it physically entered (that is, the country of last land border crossed and the last port visited by an incoming ship).
28
As trade in transit represented more than 25 percent of all trade flows of the countries in the sample, uncorrected bilateral data are distorted to a considerable extent. I performed a comprehensive correction using partner countries' transit statistics to separate actual domestic bilateral exports of immediate partners from transit that just passed through the country from where it physically arrived at its final destination. Furthermore, in view of measuring retained imports for home consumption only, I removed disguised transit and entrepôt trade volumes, that is, trade reported for merchandise that was imported with the sole purpose of being reexported.
29
To analyze systematically the relation between trade agreements and trade flows between the participating countries, I employed the standard method in this field, the gravity model.
For aggregate trade flows, it is used in its basic specification, and thus results are comparable to those obtained by Accominotti and Flandreau, and Rose. 30 The gravity model relates 26 Before 1861, for "Italy" the sum of data for Sardinia, Two Sicilies, Tuscany, and the Papal States were used.
Three country-pairs have not been included in the dataset due to border issues that could not be resolved:
imports of the Zollverein and Austria-Hungary from Denmark and imports of Austria-Hungary from Switzerland. 27 Lampe, "Bilateral Trade Flows." 28 A prominent example is British pig and bar iron exported to Germany via the Netherlands or Belgium. 29 The practice of disguised transit avoided complications and costs associated with bureaucratic transit and bond procedures. It was most attractive for duty-free goods. Because the merchandise was declared as imported for the home-market twice (in the country "disguisedly transited" and at its final destination after The specification of the gravity model is modified for the disaggregated research design, because some of the explanatory variables employed at the aggregate level do not necessarily explain trade in individual commodity-groups, due to differing national production structures.
In the commodity-level estimates, elements of bilateral import functions and the original 31 Income per capita is not a theoretically required part of the gravity equation, and has been introduced mainly for comparison in the same way as in Rose, "Do We Really Know?"; and Accominotti and Flandreau, "Bilateral Trade Treaties." Its omission does not have any qualitative impact on the estimates, except that the coefficient for Cobden becomes insignificant in the PPML core estimate. 32 Popular variables that were omitted because they would have identified only one country or country-pairs already otherwise covered are island status, landlocked, colonial ties, and the Latin Monetary Union. 33 The Civil War variable was coded as "1" for the United States as an importer or exporter from 1861 to 1865, inclusive. The European war variable was coded for the Second Italian War of Independence (1859) and the Franco-Prussian War (1870/71), and has a value of "1" if in a country-pair, one country is at war, or if major trade flows between two countries transit a country at war. 34 To account for border changes, effects for Austria-Hungary, France, Germany and Italy have been split up.
Country-specific dummy variables are included following the concept of "multilateral resistance"; see Anderson and van Wincoop, "Gravity"; and Baldwin and Taglioni, "Gravity." Baldwin and Taglioni demonstrate that one should correctly use time-varying fixed effects. However, in our case, this would involve the introduction of 140 additional dummies in estimation with 420 observations, leading to an unacceptable decrease in degrees of freedom. Exploratory tests with country-fixed effects for periods of four to six years demonstrated that significance and sign of the results presented here remain unchanged for OLS estimates. For PPML estimates (see below), the infeasibility of this approach for the present dataset was proven, as the suest correction proved impossible. As to the size of the effects, the presented estimates here should be seen as upper-bounds. gravity approach are combined in the following way: Importers' national income (Y i ) is maintained as a right-hand side variable, as it is the best available demand measure in our period. 35 In contrast, exporters' national income is dropped, because the assumption of uniform production and export structures across commodity groups for all countries is implausible. To account for internationally differing production capacities in each commodity-group, proxies for comparative advantage and specific factor endowments would be proper measures, but unfortunately they are not available for the period under study to a satisfactory extent. Hence, they were proxied by time-invariant exporter dummies, assuming that the international distribution of production did not change substantially.
Distance (D ij ) as a proxy for bilateral transport costs is maintained in the estimates, as are the dummies for common language, borders, wars, and importer-and period-specific fixed effects contained in Σβ m Σln(Z ijm ) t . Thus, the commodity-specific equation is:
To assess the effects of the treaties, three kinds of dummy variables have been coded from the treaty texts: a) a variable called Cobden that captures the presence of a treaty in general Nevertheless, because tailor-made preferences in many cases were very specific, their impact on trade in the respective category might not be traceable by commodity group- 35 Humphrey, "Disaggregated Import Functions", Konno and Fukushige, "Bilateral Import Demand Functions."
The simultaneous inclusion of national incomes Y i and Y i /Pop i led to inappropriate estimates. As a consequence, per capita incomes were dropped, because they are not theoretically required. 36 For example, in its treaty with Portugal of 1866, France agreed to limit its duties on wine to 0.30 Francs per hectoliter (then the actual general-tariff rate). Via MFN the United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, Belgium, and the Netherlands, among others, also "benefitted" formally, despite lacking significant wine producers. Parry, ed., Consolidated Treaty Series, vol. 132, specific dummy-variables. 37 Figure 1 shows the evolution of Cobden, MFN, and Tailor for both the core and extended sample over time.
[ Figure 1 about here]
In the basic equation for aggregate trade, the treaties can only be introduced through the dummy variable Cobden. By contrast, at the commodity-group level Cobden, and Tailor can be differentiated and are included in separately estimated models. As the previous section has shown that specific liberalizations were central to the network, I expect to find a clearer picture for Tailor and MFN than for Cobden, because the latter is only a very rough proxy at the disaggregated level. It is coded as "1" for all commodity groups, if a bilateral treaty exists, although not all commodity groups were necessarily covered by that treaty.
The model is later refined to assess the evolution of treaty effects and to link specific liberalizations to the development of exports at the national level as described below.
Technically, I estimate equation (2) The commodity-group specific estimates are then converted into a system of seemingly unrelated regressions to correct for cross-equation error correlations due to identical conditions in the time dimension.
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All estimates were made using unidirectional trade flows (imports) and data in nominal current prices converted to £ Sterling at annual average nominal exchange rates. 123-28. 38 Santos Silva and Tenreyro, "Log," have shown that LS estimates of log-linear models (like equations 1 and 2) are likely inefficient, biased, and/or even inconsistent. They proposed PPML with robust standard errors as a superior alternative. Additionally, PPML allows for including "0" observations in the dependent variable, which have to be excluded or treated improperly under log-linear OLS estimates. 39 See also Subramanian and Wei, "WTO." This is done using suest, a nonstandard application of the sandwich estimator implemented in STATA. It calculates robust standard errors that also account for clustering by county-pairs (Weesie, "sg121") . Additionally, it allows estimating consistent cross-equation "average effects" (constrained coefficients) for specific variables using Wald tests. 40 Baldwin and Taglioni, "Gravity." Exchange rates are from Schneider, Schwarzer and Zellfelder, Währungen; and Denzel, Währungen. Data was rounded to thousands of pounds because of different degrees of detailedness of national statistics; for OLS estimates, values below £ 1,000 are set to zero.
RESULTS
[ Table 4 about here] Table 4 shows the results for the estimation of equation (1) 
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[ Tables 5 and 6 about here] However, our main focus lies in the disaggregated level, because liberalizations were commodity-specific. Table 5 reports the key results of the system of commodity-group specific estimates of equation (2) for the core sample. As the full results involve a large amount of parameters (21 equations with 43 variables each), only the commodity-specific coefficients for the treaty dummies are displayed. The first column contains the estimates for Cobden, the second for MFN liberalizations, and the third for tailor-made preferences. Table   6 reports the values of the constrained (average) coefficients for the key variables across all commodity groups. They were obtained from the results underlying Table 5 , using Wald tests for equality of coefficients. The constrained coefficients are rightly signed and significantly different from zero. The coefficient for Cobden is in the same range as in Table 4 , but now significantly positive for the favored PPML-SUR estimate. In addition, we now see that 41 Accominotti and Flandreau, "Bilateral Trade Treaties," Tables 4 and 5 . 42 This might be attributed to the fact that US exports of, for example, cotton and tobacco, are not included in the dataset. Wars in Europe were rather short and did not systematically disrupt overall trade flows. 43 Ibid. See note 31 on a simple robustness check for the Cobden coefficient in PPML core: The exclusion of income per capita leads to an insignificant estimate. commodity-specific preferences had a traceable impact on trade flows: The constrained coefficients for MFN and Tailor are statistically significant and positive in their respective models. Furthermore, in the disaggregated estimations, the average effect of wars both in the United States and in Europe is now estimated as significantly negative by PPML. This confirms that the disaggregated estimates do not only contain more information, but also allow more precise point estimates. The Pseudo-R² is 0.90 for the system, ranging from 0.81 (for silk) to 0.97 (for linens and wine) in the commodity-group equations.
Nevertheless, the p-values from corresponding Wald-test χ²-statistics for equality of coefficients in Table 6 make clear that the constrained coefficients themselves do not represent identical coefficients across equations. Therefore, the results for commodityspecific equations deserve attention. For the demand variable Y i , a positive coefficient that is statistically significant at the 5 percent level could be estimated in ten of the 21 equations only (for four other equations the coefficients are positive, but not significant at the 5 percent level). This might be at least partly attributed to the inclusion of importer-specific effects that also account for country-specific demand structures. Distance seems to have had a more uniform impact: Its estimated coefficient is significantly negative in 19 equations and insignificantly negative in one other.
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Examining the commodity-specific coefficients for the treaty dummies in Table 5 , we find first of all that for the Cobden dummy-which simply models the conclusion of a commercial treaty-significantly positive effects on trade are only found only in commodity groups in which specific liberalizations as modeled by MFN and Tailor had also had significantly positive effects. As these commodity groups also rank among those with the highest frequencies of commodity-specific stipulations (Table 2) , we might safely conclude that these "treaty effects" were-unsurprisingly-driven by underlying specific liberalizations, and that the results for MFN and Tailor are decisive. 45 We see that MFN and Tailor had significantly positive effects mainly in manufactures that were subject to high duties before 1859: articles of leather and rubber (for example, gloves, purses, saddlery), textiles of wool, cotton and silk, and spirits. There are also significantly positive results for grains and meals and flours, but these should not be overinterpreted, as they refer to a relatively small number of country-pairs only, in which either Germany or Austria-Hungary was always the importer (their mutual preferences on grains should be predominant here). The results from the extended sample reported in Appendix 3 confirm the results of the core sample, and additionally indicate significantly positive effects for the 44 Commodity group-specific results refer to the PPML-SUR equation system including the variable MFN, but also hold for the other PPML systems with a very small degree of variation. 45 In an earlier version of this article, decomposed net effects of Cobden were assessed. It resulted that -except for linen yarn, the effect of Cobden minus MFN was not significantly positive for all commodity groups. remaining cloth category, linens, and for pig iron and steel. 46 Furthermore, the differences of OLS and PPML estimates are small, which can be taken as an additional indication of robustness of the results. The question whether tailor-made preferences or their transmission and the expansion of the network via MFN drove the results cannot be conclusively answered from Table 5 . Only for woolen and worsted yarns do we find positive effects for Tailor, but not for MFN, while for three groups of manufactured goods we find the contrary. This indicates that tailor-made preferences might be inadequately captured by the dummies, and further research using more refined measures is recommended. Notwithstanding this, Tables 5   and 6 give firm evidence that the treaties helped to increase trade flows significantly for many commodities, mostly manufactures, while trade with most raw materials, especially the inputs to the respective branches (hides, skins, and leather; wool, silk), experienced no significant benefits.
Given the positive commodity-specific effects, one might ask why they did not lead to consistently positive effects at the aggregate level, and how can the effects be quantified in comparison with aggregate trade in the dataset and aggregate trade covered by treaties. To do this, I estimated a system of equations (2) for the core sample with PPML-SUR as described above, but with simultaneously included period-specific treaty effects as measured by MFN, that is, MFN*D1861, MFN*D1863, and so on.
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If the coefficient for these dummies (β MFN*1861, β MFN*1863 , etc.) was significant at the 5 percent level for a commodity group k, it was converted into percent increases in trade attributable to preferential liberalizations, which then were multiplied with actual bilateral imports for country-pairs wherein an MFN preference was in force in the corresponding commodity group. These products have been summed up across commodity groups. The evolving term is called "trade increase due to 46 The inclusion of important producers of these two articles into the extended sample can be seen as driving the results here: Russia was an important exporter of linens, while Sweden and Norway were the second most important providers of bar iron and steel to Europe and among the five main exporters of pig iron (see Lampe, "Bilateral Trade Flows," Table 12) . 47 The detailed estimation results are available on request.
We see that significant commodity-specific treaty effects in none of the years sum to more than 32.5 percent of aggregate trade between countries with a bilateral treaty in force. The average was 22.7 percent between 1861 and 1875. The first local maximum, attributable to a one-time effect of the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty in 1861 (28.4 percent) is only reached again at the end of the observation period. 49 Even the 32.5 percent, in 1875, would hardly have led to a significant coefficient for Cobden in the aggregate estimates underlying Table 4 . 50 This confirms the expectation that the treaties hardly produced uniform overall impacts.
[ Figure 2 about here]
Up to now, the results confirm our expectation that commodity-specific effects mattered.
As stated above, negotiators sought to help their domestic exporters of specific goods, especially manufactures and heavily tariffed alcoholic beverages. A central question is therefore how successful were each country's commercial diplomats in effectively helping to boost domestic exports. The straightforward way to investigate this is to include national exporter-specific effects of MFN liberalizations into the system of equations (2), that is, interaction effects of every country's exporter dummy with MFN (for example,
FRAEX*MFN, ZVEX*MFN)
, in the same may as was done above with year-specific interaction terms. The coefficients obtained from these estimates for every country's exporters in each commodity group are presented in Table 7 .
[ Table 7 about here]
The constrained "average" coefficients in the lower part of that table suggest that France, the Zollverein, Belgium, and Austria-Hungary benefitted significantly from the treaty network, while the average effect is positive, but insignificant for the United Kingdom, and significantly negative for the Netherlands. Again, the p-values from Wald test χ²-statistics indicate that the coefficients were not identical across commodity groups. If we look at these coefficients in the upper part of Table 7 , we find significantly positive coefficients mainly for
The February Treaty between Austria-Hungary and the Zollverein (1853-65) has been included in the "percent of trade covered by Cobden" figures. 49 Treaties concluded before 1861 also had no considerable effects. Notably, the effects of comprehensive preferences granted in the 1853 February Treaty between Austria-Hungary and the Zollverein, which was supposed to prepare a future accession of Austria to the Zollverein, were below 10 percent. This underlines that besides a lack of political will for the union of Austria with the Zollverein (especially in Prussia), there seems to have been a rather low potential of benefits to be obtained from the integration. 50 The coefficient for Cobden in the PPML core estimate of Table 4 corresponds to about 48.5 percent. [ Table 8 about here]
To assess the quantitative amount of benefits for each country's exporters, the commodity-group coefficients of Table 7 have been converted into "export increases due to MFN liberalizations by partner countries," as was done above for year-wise estimates, using partner import data for 1875.
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Their values (Table 8) show that French exporters benefited most, followed by the Zollverein, Austria-Hungary and Belgium. The export increases for the United Kingdom and Belgium are the smallest in relative terms, and even negative for the Netherlands. From these results on the distribution of gains from the network, we can conclude that it benefitted most those countries whose negotiators primarily aimed at strategically using the treaties to bring down partner tariffs, while the "unilateralists" from Britain and the Netherlands who generalized all preferences even to non-treaty partners and did not participate actively in the expansion of the network, did not share its benefits.
Belgium presents a special case because its government used the treaties mainly to bargain for the participation of contract partners in the capitalization of the Scheldt Toll, which, until 51 Because treaty effects were highest in 1875, the amounts reported in Table 8 Assessing the effects of the treaties, it is shown that previous research was correct about their inefficacy to boost the total trade in Europe, but it was mistaken about the actual effectiveness of commercial diplomacy, regarding its actual goals. Using disaggregated trade data, it can be demonstrated that the treaties were effective in enhancing trade, but not for all commodities.
Their effects were most notable in final products, especially textiles. By this, the treaties contributed to the deepening and diversification of intra-European trade.
Exporters from those countries whose governments were driving forces in the formation of the treaty network and which strategically used the treaties to bring down partner tariffs reaped the highest benefits. In form and effect, nineteenth-century bilateralism was ideologically closer to first-difference reciprocity than to the free trade doctrine. Hence, it is an irony of history that it has become identified with the names of Cobden and Chevalier.
Instead, French Minister Eugène Rouher or Prussian Commercial Councillor Rudolf von
Dellbrück, moderate free-traders with a realpolitik background, would be more aptly named as its patrons. 52 Mahaim, "Politique commerciale." (Parry, ed., Consolidated Treaty Series, Vols. 145, ).
This treaty is not included in the published version of this article (Journal of Economic History, 69, 2009 ). This does not alter the results of the present study in any way, since neither Italy nor Portugal are importers in the core or extended sample. The treaty contains the unconditional MFN clause, although with reservation of special treatment for Brazil by Portugal ( §2). It was to be in force for 4 years, a very short period, with a one-year notification term afterwards ( §27). It stipulated no new preferences for Portuguese articles in Italy, but Portugal granted preferential tariff rates for the following products of Italian origin: Carded hemp: 20 reis per kg; packing or wrapping paper of all kinds: 15 reis per kg, marbles, raw: 1% ad valorem; Marbles, wrought (lavorati): 1% ad valorem; Stones not specified, wrought: 1% ad valorem; Men's hats of all kinds: 20 % ad valorem. As a consequence of the MFN clause, the second column of Table 2 has been slightly updated in comparison to the published version, in the first column only the totals have been changed. Also the total number of treaties and the number of treaties with new preferences has been updated on p. 6.
SOURCES FOR NATIONAL INCOME DATA
GDPs/GNPs in current prices were obtained from B. R. Mitchell for the United Kingdom, France, the United States, and Denmark. Escosura were used, and the national income for Portugal is from the estimate by Anabela Nunes, Eugénia Mata, and Nuno Valério. For Russia, data were extrapolated from a national income series in current prices by Paul Gregory with Raymond Goldsmith's agricultural and industrial production figures (weighting agriculture and industry 9:1, following Gregory). As Source: Lampe, "Bilateral Trade Flows," Table 13 . Note: Overall average tariff: Ratio of duties recollected to total imports for home consumption. Export weighted average tariff: commodity-group tariff rates weighted by an unweighted average of every country's average export shares for each commodity group in 1865. Imports for home consumption for the UK and the US = imports -re-exports. "Silk wares" include fine textiles made from other fibres. US tariff rates exclude imports of raw material that entered free of duty from Canada and other British Provinces in North America under the Elgin-Marcy Treaty (in force 1854-1866); taking into account these duty-free imports, ad valorem equivalent average tariffs decrease to 0.1% for wheat, 0.0% for rye, 0.2% for milling products, 6.6% for hides, skins and leather, 0.0% for wood and 1.1% for wool. Tariff rates for spirits and liqueurs were corrected for domestic excises and production taxes which were included in the official customs duties of some countries, but not of others, and are now "tariff only". 
